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Hongmei Gao
Kennesaw State University

Penelope Prime
Mercer University, Atlanta

FACILITATORS AND OBSTACLES OF
INTERCULTURAL BUSINESS COMMUNICATION
FOR AMERICAN COMPANIES IN CHINA:
LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE UPS CASE
ABSTRACT
This article analyzes how the execution of business strategy for global enterprises is shaped by the dual challenges of communicating in a different
national culture and working in a changing economic environment. The article develops a framework from the UPS case in China to illustrate the key
components of strategy for US companies operating businesses in China. The
article proposes that Chinese-American communication effectiveness can be
achieved through overcoming five obstacles: cultural multiplicity, relationship/task orientation, time concept, business style difference, and language
use, while utilizing five facilitators: pragmatism, gender equality, English,
American pop culture, and a “big country mentality.”
INTRODUCTION
Companies of all sizes are becoming global players physically and virtually.
However, the reality of successfully executing a global business strategy in a
particular geographic, cultural, and linguistic location continues to be a challenge. Global business strategies on paper as compared with in practice can be
quite different because of the challenges of intercultural communication and
changing business environments. In this article, we propose a framework of
cultural facilitators and obstacles for Chinese-American cross-cultural communication for American companies conducting business in China, which we
then illustrate with the case of UPS’s China entry and expansion.1
1 UPS: United Parcel Service, a Fortune 500 company headquartered in Atlanta, USA.

Founded in 1907 as a messenger company in the United States, UPS has grown into a
multi-billion-dollar corporation by focusing on the goal of enabling commerce around
the globe. UPS is the world’s largest package delivery company and a leading global
provider of specialized transportation and logistics services. UPS manages the flow of
goods, funds, and information in more than 200 countries and territories worldwide
(UPS Website, “About UPS,” 2010; CNN Website, 2010).
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There are many well-established motivations and strategies for companies
to invest abroad (Deresky, 2008). Cultural and economic factors confronted in
a particular market can either facilitate or obstruct the implementation of any
specific strategy. We specifically focus on the interaction between economic
and cultural facilitators and obstacles in the China market for US companies.
From the economic perspective, key factors in the Chinese context include
timing of entry, sectors and locations that are open to foreign firms for expansion, the stage of Chinese economic reforms, the legal-regulatory environment
at both central and local governmental levels, the priorities of policies, and
changing market conditions that include income levels, consumer tastes, and
market participants. From the cultural perspective, key factors in the Chinese
context include regional cultural differences, linguistic barriers, One Child
Policy consequences, the Chinese mentality, business style differences, and
relationship/task orientation. Despite the general framework that we introduce,
it needs to be recognized that in some cases whether these factors are obstacles
or facilitators to investment varies by industry and region.
How the Chinese economy and society evolve affects business culture.
For example, when the horizontal nature of a market economy develops in
China, the need for guanxi, or relationships, to get things done becomes
subtle and less apparent. Foreign companies can increasingly use the market
to obtain resources or to market their products or services, instead of relying heavily on go-betweens and favors as in the past. This is not to say that
guanxi is no longer important as the Chinese market matures, but rather that
guanxi may become more of a facilitator than a necessity for international
business in China.
This research was approached with a theoretical foundation incorporating
various communication theories applied to the Chinese-American business
context, including Hofstede’s five cultural dimensions, Hall’s context analysis, Ting-Toomey’s Face Negotiation argument, Schulster’s task-relationship
dichotomy, and Fons Trompenaars and Charles Hampden-Turner’s cultural
orientation. A framework for analyzing Chinese-American business communication was developed, and then applied to the case of United Parcel
Service (UPS).
This study is a result of a multi-phase and multi-case longitudinal case
study project with various American multinational corporations with Chinese operations. We have conducted in-depth or focus group interviews
with upper-level managers of Inductotherm, The Sports Authority, Home
Depot, and UPS. We conducted the most in-depth and extensive interviews
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with managers of UPS in both Atlanta and Shanghai. Our research method
was qualitative, and our inquiry was guided by “why” rather than “what”
(Lindlof and Taylor, 2002) in regards to the effectiveness of intercultural
business communication.
In spring 2007, a total of four in-depth interviews were conducted with
UPS’s vice presidents and supply chain managers, each for about two hours,
in the UPS Atlanta, Georgia, headquarters. The interview guide focused on
their perception, experience, and insights on Chinese-American business communication. Then, in the summer of 2007, a three-hour focus group interview
with sixteen executives at UPS Shanghai was conducted in Shanghai, China,
by the authors. In addition, an interview was conducted in summer 2010 with
Mr. James Xiong of UPS Hub in Shanghai Pudong International Airport
about UPS’s progress in China. These UPS interviews generated over 500
pages of transcripts. The content of the transcripts was analyzed for patterns
of strategies and obstacles in intercultural business communication between
the Americans and the Chinese. With the participants’ consent, all names
cited are real names with the positions held at the time of the interviews.2
The next section introduces the context of UPS’s business history and its
entry into China as part of its international business strategy. The third section
outlines a set of facilitators and challenges in the US-China business context
that virtually all US firms deal with to one extent or another. The fourth section
applies this set of general principles in order to understand UPS’s business
expansion in China. The final section concludes with observations about US
companies’ business communication strategies and obstacles in China, as well
as how China’s economy has changed over this time period.
THE CASE OF UPS IN CHINA
By many measures, UPS has been successful in China. This success has occurred despite being in a service industry that has faced more restrictions in
2

We would like to thank all those from UPS who spent time with us sharing their
knowledge and views on UPS’s global development. We especially thank David Abney for sharing his thoughts to the Executive MBA class at Mercer University during
the summer, 2007, and for helping us contact his colleagues in Asia. As head of Asia
Operations, Richard Loi was instrumental in arranging all of our interviews in China.
Eric Chung and Edward Choi met with us on multiple occasions. We are grateful to
the entire Shanghai and Guangzhou groups for their contributions in person and with
follow-up information. In Atlanta, we especially thank Ken Lee and Jim Thompson
for their time and insights.
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China for longer than have other sectors, such as manufacturing. This case
analysis was generated from in-depth individual and focus group interviews
both in Atlanta and Shanghai helping to identify success factors at UPS by
showing how the company has utilized facilitators and dealt with obstacles
with respect to both the economic-business environment and intercultural
communication.
UPS was established in 1907 in Seattle as a messenger service. For seventy
years the company’s focus was building the domestic US market, state by
state. Once UPS offered service to every address in the continental United
States, the company expanded to Canada in 1975 and to Germany in 1976.
This process of expansion was challenging in part because the leadership
thought they could do business in these countries as they had done in the
United States. They quickly discovered otherwise. Through learning and
training, UPS has grown into a global multinational company with operations
in over 200 countries. Approximately 16% of the company’s employees are
overseas, and about 25% of revenues are generated outside of the United
States. This transformation is a remarkable achievement, especially in light
of the fact that much of the top management has been with the company for
three decades or more.
Along with the growth in global markets, UPS redefined its mission to
include information and money transport, along with goods. This coincides
with their strategy of building UPS into an integrated global supply chain
company. According to the former chairman, Jim Kelly, these are examples
of the payoffs of the company’s conscious move to emphasize innovation
rather than replication, even though replicating successful core businesses
had been a winning strategy for many years (Kirby, 2002).
The success of UPS mirrors the growth in international trade worldwide.
The fact that the US economy has been one of the key drivers of that trade has
helped UPS in their global expansion.3 In many countries, the main operation
for UPS involves exports-imports rather than domestic package delivery.
This is also the case in China, although UPS is positioning itself to grow as
the domestic Chinese market grows, pending resolution of regulation issues
and other challenges. Nonetheless, UPS approaches domestic markets as a
“local company,” even as it prides itself on being a “global” company with
procedures and policies that are consistent wherever UPS operates.4
3

Interview with Kenneth L. Lee, Vice President of Security, 31 Oct. 2007, Atlanta.
In our discussions with UPS employees in China, the company was consistently
presented as a global company rather than a US or a Chinese company.
4
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These UPS characteristics expressed by representatives of the company
fit with the definition of a transnational corporation (TNC) (Deresky, 2008).
A TNC reorganizes its activities globally to lower costs while also creating
strategies to be responsive to local markets. Recently the procurement side of
UPS has also begun to function in a way consistent with the characteristics of
a transnational firm.5 For years the US and European operations purchased
such things as automotive parts, mailing envelopes, office supplies, and invoices regionally or locally for local use. Now UPS has begun to look at what
the company buys as a global organization, and manages these purchases,
in some cases outsourcing their production of various categories of goods.
They began with their customer package supplies, and with this initial phase
of moving procurement globally, UPS saved $30 to $35 million annually.
UPS first entered China in 1988 (see Table 1). At that time their options
were limited, as China was not yet a member of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) and economic reforms were still in the early stages. Some companies
that entered at this time eventually pulled out, or scaled back, until conditions improved.
Right after UPS entered the Chinese market in 1988, conditions worsened quickly. High inflation plagued the economy as a result of its rapid
growth. Government finances were not in good shape, as revenue collection
could not keep up with growth in incomes. Public perceptions of rampant
corruption combined with eroding real income for most people led to growing discontent and demonstrations by office and factory workers, as well as
students, throughout the month of May 1989. The violent ending to these
demonstrations on June 4th raised many questions about how, and if, China
would continue economic reform.
By 1992, when the Chinese top leadership decided to go forward with
reforms, rapid and substantial increases in foreign direct investment (FDI) began. It was in this environment that UPS set up its three representative offices
in 1994. At this time UPS targeted the growing export market as a supplier
of package shipment services, but setting up distribution within the domestic
market was still not possible. Then, two years later, UPS established a formal
joint venture with the main Chinese distribution company—Sinotrans.
As the rules concerning joint ventures were relaxed, in December 2004
UPS acquired its Chinese joint venture partner for US$100 million. Starting

5

Interview with Jim Thompson, Global Direct Sourcing Group manager, 7 Nov.
2007, Atlanta.
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Table 1: UPS in China:
A Summary of Major Events and the Business Context
Date

Event

Business Environment

1988

UPS enters China with partner
Partner relationship is required
Sinotrans via an agency agreement

1994

UPS opens representative offices in Beijing, Shanghai, and
Guangzhou

1996

UPS and Sinotrans establish formal joint venture

1999

The JV extends service to 21 cities

2001

The JV expands to 40 cities
—UPS begins direct flights
between China and the US; UPS
gains 12 flights between China
and the US

China joined the WTO in December 2001

2003

UPS begins working with Yangtze
River Express
—UPS establishes Shanghai
as its Greater China District
headquarters

WTO agreement included allowing
foreign companies to arrange their
own distribution networks rather
than being required to use Chinese
companies

2004

UPS employs nearly 400 people
in China

2005

UPS takes over international
express operations from Sinotrans
in 23 locations
—UPS employment grows to over
4,000 people in China
—UPS is selected as a 2008
Olympic sponsor

Reforms in progress after Deng
Xiaoping made his famous journey
to southern China in early 1992 and
jump started growth after a period
of uncertainty following the June
4th Tiananmen incident in 1989;
substantial increases in foreign
investment began

First in industry to operate a wholly
owned company in China; this
option was not possible earlier because of regulations within China;
the WTO agreement laid a basis for
negotiating more foreign company
participation in services; the Hong
Kong CEPA agreement allowed
UPS to form the wholly owned
company one year ahead of others
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Table 1, continued
Date

Event

Business Environment

2006

—UPS begins daily flights
between China and Japan
—Begins retail operations with 2
Express Stores in Shanghai
—Begins direct flight service
between China and Europe
—UPS Direct Sourcing group
begins exploring procurement
options in China

China’s economy continued to
grow fast—over 10%, despite
attempts to create more balance
across sectors and geography, and
to slow growth some

2007

Shanghai Airport Authority and
UPS sign agreement for construction of a UPS International Air
Hub based at Pudong Airport

By the end of the year inflation had
jumped to over 4%, and exports
were starting to slow. Product liability issues earned global attention

2008

UPS PVG Hub at Shanghai
Pudong International Airport
opens.
A total of US$125 million has
been invested in this hub, which
makes UPS the largest forwarder
in Shanghai in 2010

The global financial crisis swept
over the world, but China and India
seemed to be immune to this crisis
overall. Some export-oriented
factories in China closed

2009

Total UPS global revenue is at
US$37.9 billion.
Shanghai PVG Hub sorts through
17,000 pieces per hour with onestep operations

The global economy in financial
crisis, but the Chinese government’s $846-million stimulus plan
still gave China a 9% growth rate
for GDP

2010

UPS becomes the largest forwarder in Shanghai in 2010. UPS
exports twice as many goods as it
imports at PVG

Chinese economy expected to have
an annual GDP growth of 8.7%

from January 2005, UPS assumed complete control of operations in 23 locations, starting with Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Tianjin, and Qingdao.
Together, the 23 operational regions covered 200 cities and accounted for
over 80% of its delivery service in China. Thus, UPS became one of the three
major international delivery services in China along with DHL and FedEx
(Denlinger, 2004). By 2010, with its newly constructed Shanghai PVG Hub
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at the Pudong International Airport, UPS became the largest forwarder in
Shanghai, according to Mr. James Xiong, the Gateway Manager of UPS Hub
at the Pudong International Airport on July 20, 2010.
Effective intercultural communication during and after UPS’s merger
with Sinotrans was one of the most challenging aspects of the UPS expansion in China, especially as the company grew from about 400 employees
to over 4,000 in a couple of months. We argue that UPS has been trying to
maximize the facilitators and minimize the obstacles for effective intercultural
business communication in the midst of these rapidly changing business and
economic conditions.
CULTURAL FACILITATORS AND OBSTACLES
Embedded in challenges with training, sales, and overall profitability in a
foreign market is the ability to articulate home company goals in a culturally different environment. American companies need to develop mutual
understanding and sufficient skills to communicate effectively within varying
linguistic and cultural contexts. Terpstra (1991) argues that the multiplicity of
language use and the diversity of cultures in the world economy have a constraining influence on the operation of international business. Globalization of
multinational corporations (MNCs) has created a need for better understanding of business processes that are embedded in a network of subsidiaries and
headquarters located in environments with differences in national, regional,
racial, and ethnic cultures.
Scholars have written about the difference between cultures from various
perspectives (Hofstede, 1980; Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 2004;
Ting-Toomey, 1999). However, there is a lack of literature that synthesizes a
systematic framework for effective Chinese-American communication. USChina trade dominates the Asia Pacific region. Approximately 19% of US
imports originated in China in 2009, with total US imports from China equal
to $296,373 million, making China the United States’s largest trading partner
for imports and its second largest trading partner overall (US Census Bureau,
2010). China was also the second largest recipient of foreign investment in
2009, second only to the United States, with US firms falling into the top ten
investing countries (US–China Business Council, 2010).
In the culturally divergent business environment of MNCs, many factors
impact their internal and external communication, including the employees’
language, culture, mindset, personal experience, philosophies of life, and
ways of doing business. We applied the five obstacles and five facilitators
of Chinese and American intercultural business communication to help us
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interpret interviews from the UPS case. The five obstacles are cultural multiplicity, relationship/task orientation, time concept, business [communication] style difference, and language use (see Figure 1).The five facilitators
are pragmatism, gender equality, English, American pop culture, and a big
country mentality (see Figure 2). These will be discussed in turn.

Figure 1: Chinese-American Communication Obstacles
O1: Cultural Multiplicity
Synthesizing the theories of Hofstede (Culture’s Consequences, 1980;
“Hofstede’s Five,” 2010), Hall (1976), Ting-Toomey (1999), and Copeland
and Schuster (2006), we know that China has a collectivist, hierarchical,
high-context, and relationship-oriented culture. In contrast, the United States
has an individualistic, horizontal, low-context, and task-oriented culture.
Concerning business, the collectivist culture emphasizes group interest,
conformity, and harmony; the hierarchical structure of a collectivist society
demands respect for elders, managers, and professors that discourages challenges to authorities. China’s high-context culture creates an indirect and
subtle communication style in which only a third of the message is spoken
while two-thirds is embedded in the context, including codes in nonverbal
behavior, social status, and solidarity of relationship between the speaker and
listener. The ability to decode the contextual message is critical to success in
correctly understanding a Chinese business partner. Americans who use the
direct communication style will very possibly miss much of the contextual
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message sent from the Chinese partner, while a subtle-minded Chinese person
will second guess his/her American partner and misunderstand the American
(Gao, “Invisible,” 2005). In addition, Hofstede’s individualism index shows
that the United States has an individualist culture that encourages individual
differences, success, and happiness, while China has a collective culture,
which prefers group solidarity and group outcomes (Bond, 1991).
Beside the macro difference between American and Chinese cultures, both
countries have a multiplicity of regional cultures and subcultures separated
by geographical regions, demographics, and levels of economic development.
For example, Jim, a 57-year-old US expatriate working in UPS stated the
importance of coming to China with no assumptions:
Do not form opinions too quickly. When you come to China, when you
first see things, you really have to say that it happens at this place this time.
China is not one country; it’s many countries, both in time, space and in
social class. The Chinese culture is not three-dimensional; it’s probably
seven-dimensional, with geographical region multiplied by historical eras.

American or Chinese business people should never assume that the macro
Chinese or American cultural models that they learned prior to their overseas
trip can completely apply to a group of Chinese or Americans from a particular
region or of a particular race/ethnicity. This particular group could be very
different from the “standard” Chinese/American culture that is presented in
textbooks, training manuals, and tour books. It is critical to keep an open mind
while interacting with cultural others on an interpersonal level for cultural
learning in the real sense (Gudykunst and Kim, 2003).
O2: Relationship or Task Orientation
Copeland and Schuster (2006) categorize cultures by whether they are
relationship-oriented or task-oriented. American culture is task-oriented,
while Chinese culture is relationship-oriented. In a culture where harmony
is the center of focus advocated by Confucius since the sixth century BC,
relationship is of particular importance to the Chinese communication mentality and style, or guanxi. In Chinese etymology, guanxi is a combination of
two Chinese characters: guan (“door, gate, or passage”) and xi (“connection,
group or organization”). The combination of these two Chinese characters
refers to relationships, connections and “access to a group, community or
organization” (Hackley and Dong, 2001, Wong and Leung, 2001). Guanxi
requires intentionality and reciprocity for social capital exchange within a
“whom-you-know” rather than “what-you-know” framework (Gao, “Compar-
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ing,” 2008). An important implication of guanxi for business is that Chinese
partners care about establishing a mutual relationship with Americans on an
interpersonal level before contracts are signed.
In an MNC, if an American employer takes an interest in the Chinese
employees’ personal lives in addition to caring for their career development,
the employees are very likely to develop loyalty to the employers. Chinese
people also respect hierarchy more than Westerners do. For instance, it
is hard for Chinese employees to imagine that their Western counterparts
interact with their bosses on a first-name basis. The Chinese tradition is
that you must demonstrate obedience with no argument to the orders from
those who are superior in rank. Even if one does not agree with a Chinese
partner, disagreement should be expressed in an indirect way to protect his/
her face (Gao and Ting-Toomey, 1998) and to protect the relationship that is
expected to be reciprocal (Gao, “Comparing,” 2008). American businesses
need to understand the “face” concept and try to “give face” to their Chinese
partners whenever possible by providing gifts, being punctual, showing
respect, and learning the Chinese language and culture. Chinese people are
usually hospitable, and such hospitality has certain resemblances to Southern
hospitality in the United States.
O3: Time Concept
Time concept difference is one of the major obstacles for Chinese-American
communication. Such differences are three fold: expectation for the future,
time perspectives, and awareness of time zones. First, Hofstede and Bond
(1984) show that the main discrepancy between Chinese and American culture is in their Long Term Orientation (LTO) index, which is also known as
the Confucianism dynamism. People in China prefer to plan their lives (not
schedules) well ahead. For example, they set long-term goals to save money
for purchasing a house and their children’s education. This is part of the reason why China has one of the world’s highest savings rates. On the contrary,
Americans prefer short-term planning and immediate rewards. Americans
like to enjoy things now, and are willing to borrow for these short-run goals.
Yet it may seem paradoxical that the Chinese plan their lives with a longterm view, but seem to be “unstructured” in their daily schedules. This is
because the Chinese are on a polychromic time (P-time), while the Americans
are on a monochromic time (M-time). As a result Americans seem to have
lots of unknowns in schedule building when in China. Multiple appointments
could be arranged at the same hour in case some do not show up, and some
visitors will simply pop in without appointments. Day planners, while made
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in China for Americans, are rarely used in China. Chinese visitors often are
viewed by their American counterparts as not planning ahead enough in
scheduling for appointments prior to a trip to the United States, not to mention
schedule complications brought about by the US visa application process.
Americans tend to be more punctual then the Chinese; however, in big cities
such as Shanghai and Beijing, business people are becoming very punctual as
well, given their own new, fast-paced lives. Paul, a US diplomat in Shanghai,
mentioned that since he found there was much uncertainty about the daily
schedule in China, he formally arranged 30% of his daily time, and left 70%
free to cope with uncertainties. One needs to learn that things do not occur
on schedule as often as in the United States (Gao, “Overcoming,” 2006).
Logistically speaking, transnational business people are aware that the
United States and China are located in different time zones and they need to
calculate in order to make phone calls at convenient times, if possible, for
the receiver. Further, both countries are located across several time zones.
However, the collectivist culture in China dictates that all of China uses one
time—Beijing time; while in the continental United States, there are four
time zones. In addition, there is a summer daylight saving time in the United
States. When people from China try to do business with the United States, they
need to take time zones and summer daylight saving time into consideration.
O4: Business Style Difference
The American task-oriented culture and the Chinese relationship-oriented
culture generate different business styles. Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner
(2004) state that the United States has a specific-orientated culture, and
American people opt to separate their work from their private life. Business
people usually will not call their partners’ home phones. In contrast, for
the Chinese, work and private-life are linked, a perspective from a diffuseorientated society. Closely related to the guanxi concept, the Chinese extend
friendship beyond the workplace, which blurs the work-life boundaries. The
Chinese often invite business partners for dinner together and during such
wine’n’dine and karaoke occasions, business deals are reached and closed.
Technology use is another major difference in how the Chinese and
Americans communicate. In China, almost every business person has a cell
phone and text messaging is very commonly used for business, while in
the United States, BlackBerrys and iPhones are common and people like to
leave voice messages for business. Emails are used in both countries, but in
the United States they are far more common in the business sphere than in
China. Given these differences, we see that a Chinese person might hesitate
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and not leave an email message while an American might wonder why he/
she is not receiving a response in a timely manner.
Hofstede’s value dimensions show America is a horizontal society, while
China is a hierarchical society. People in the United States regard individuals as more or less equal, while people in China accept the fact that power is
distributed unevenly. Thus the Chinese show more respect for others based
on their social status, age, and social position. Trompenaars and HampdenTurner (2004) state that China is known as an ascription society where people
are rewarded on their status in the hierarchical social ladder, compared with
America where emphasis is placed on individual achievement.
Having an individualistic society, Americans face many obstacles in
dealing with the group-oriented Chinese. For example, Americans, often
“go Dutch” when paying bills and might find it difficult to have to pay for
the group after a dinner in China. The in-group versus out-group distinction
is another structural phenomenon for the Chinese communication style.
An in-group member is one with whom one needs to maintain a reciprocal
relationship, and an out-group member is simply an acquaintance. To get
things done in China, a business person usually needs to become an in-group
member with the decision-maker for the desired transactions (Gao, “Overcoming,” 2006). As a cultural stranger, it is only natural that an American
business person is seen and treated as an out-group member by the local
Chinese. There are strategies, however, that out-group members can adopt
to transform themselves into in-group members, such as third-party referral,
guanxi cultivation (Gao, “Comparing,” 2008), and benefit sharing. However
such a transformation process takes a long time, and there is no guarantee
that a local Chinese person will award in-group membership to an American,
or a Chinese-American.
O5: Language Use
Despite the fact that there are more people in China learning English than the
total US population, not all Chinese speak English. Though many Chinese
business partners have learned English and try to speak it, not all Chinese
partners can communicate in English. Their levels of English proficiency
vary based on their age, region, and educational background. After graduating
from high school, oral English skills often recede from lack of practice. Thus,
not all educated Chinese speak English, and only a limited number of them
speak it fluently. Further, among the older generation and in less economically
developed areas, English proficiency is rare for a Chinese business person.
Also, many people in China learned British English, or more realistically,
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Chinglish.6 Their grasp of English is in many cases not sophisticated enough
for communication on a subtle level for relationship building.
Other than the insufficient proficiency of many Chinese business people,
the “meaning”— the essence of communication—can be lost in translation,
when we consider la langue, including the language, dialect, and accents
involved. If Americans learn Mandarin Chinese, they might find themselves
having difficulty understanding the local dialects (for example, Cantonese,
Shanghai dialect, or Sichuan dialect), which often sound like a totally different language. Besides, there are over 10 written languages used in China,
such as Mongolian, Tibetan, Korean, and Dai, which become important if
business is conducted in ethnic regions in China.
Lack of linguistic proficiency on the part of both the Chinese and American communicators can create serious misunderstanding when they interact.
Common sense supported by the communication literature (for example,
Hamzah-Sendut, Madsen, and E’ Thong, 1989) indicates that limited language
proficiency changes the dynamics of the communication process. Chinese and
American business people need to learn each other’s languages and cultures
to realize that in real life, words and phrases can be used differently from
their textbook meaning.
The five facilitators are pragmatism, gender equality, English, American
pop culture, and a big country mentality (see Figure 2).
F1: Pragmatism
Geert Hofstede’s (“Hofstede’s Five,” 2010) set of five cultural dimensions
(see Table 2) rests on the indexes of each culture’s power difference (PDI),
individualism vs. collectivism (IDV), masculinity vs. femininity (MAS),
uncertainty avoidance (UAI), and long-term vs. short-term orientation (LTO).
The United States and China score almost equally on the Uncertainty
Avoidance Index. This means that both Americans and Chinese like to take
risks, are less reliant on rules and regulations, and are happy to make their own
decisions. This quality is in line with the idea of Americans being pragmatic
(Dewey, 1927) and the Chinese being realistic. After all, Deng Xiaoping,
6

Chinglish refers to spoken or written English language that is influenced by the
Chinese language and thinking. The term Chinglish usually reflects ungrammatical
and nonsensical English expressions in Chinese syntax. Other terms used to describe
such English expressions with Chinese connotations include Chinese English, Sinicized
English, or China English. It is disputed whether a Chinese variety of English shall
be considered legitimate (Jing and Zuo, 2006; He and Li, 2009; Hu, 2004).
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Figure 2: Chinese-American Business Communication Facilitators

the paramount leader and grand designer for China’s economic reform in the
1980s, reminded the Chinese to pay less attention to the name of the economy
(whether capitalist, communist, or socialist), and more attention to its productivity. Deng’s analogy concerning the economy was: “Black cat or white cat,
as long as it catches mice, it is a good cat.” The Post-Mao Chinese government has striven to be pragmatic by avoiding dogmatism while adopting a
free market economy for China—“a socialism with Chinese characteristics.”
Table 2: Comparison of US-China Cultural Dimensions
All figures in %

Acronyms

United
States

China

World Average

Power Distance Index

PDI

40

80

56.5

Individualism Index

IDV

91

20

50

Masculinity Index

MAS

62

66

65

Uncertainty Avoidance
Index

UAI

46

30

51

29

118

48

Long-term Orientation
LTO
(Source: Geert Hofstede Website, 2010)
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While negotiating business, US companies should expect Chinese partners to
be pragmatic, wanting to strike deals, no matter how long it takes. American
business people are pragmatic in the same way, as analyzed by John Dewey’s
(1927) American pragmatism argument (Hickman, 1992).
F2: Gender Equality
Decades of non-interaction between China and the United States generated
many misconceptions in the United States about the role of women in China’s
business world. US companies often wonder whether it is appropriate to send
their female executives to the negotiating table and whether hiring qualified
Chinese women for management positions hurts their chances of success in
China. According to the teachings of Confucius, a girl should defer to her
father, a wife to her husband, and a widow to her son. On the other hand,
Confucianism also teaches filial piety toward one’s parents, including the
mother. Women’s roles in society obviously have evolved significantly since
Confucius’s days. Women stopped taking their husbands’ name when Dr. Sun
Yatsen overturned the Qing Dynasty in 1911, long before the Communist
takeover. Women started working outside their homes in large numbers in the
1920s. Today, women work in most, if not all, professions and occupations
in China. Many successful entrepreneurs are women.
Hofstede’s (“Hofstede’s Five,” 2010) index shows that the two countries
score evenly on the masculinity-femininity index. This means that, relatively
speaking, both countries enjoy reasonable gender equality, and flexible gender
role expectations for men and women at work and at home. People in both
countries appreciate masculine goals such as success and achievement, and
feminine goals such as a balanced life style, nurturing, and gender equality.
The gender equality of both countries is partly due to the feminist movements
in the United States and to the Communist movement for women’s rights in
China. The feminist movement in the United States encompassed a number
of social, cultural, and political issues concerned with gender inequalities
and equal rights for women in voting and employment (Tong, 1998). The
Communist feminism movement in China, which started in the 1920s, led by
Chairman Mao, liberated Chinese women who were confined by the Confucian teaching of abiding by the husband-wife structure and limited by the
social preference of feet-binding. One of Chairman Mao’s famous sayings
was: “Women can hold up half of the sky.” Indeed, in both countries, it is
commonplace to find women in every profession and being successful both
at home and at work. In both societies, it is commonplace to see husband and
wife each earning an income and sharing housework.
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However, Chinese women encounter a glass ceiling similar to the one
that US women do. The number of women in top leadership positions is
extremely low given the size of the population. Habits from thousands of
years ago die hard. There is still an unspoken, and sometimes unintentional,
belief that at a certain level, women are inferior and less intelligent, and that
being naïve is a virtue for women. Nonetheless, we propose that similarities
in gender equality and gender role expectation in both countries serve more
as a facilitator than an obstacle for people from China and America doing
business together.
F3: English, the Global Lingua Franca
English has become a global lingua franca (Gao and Womack, 2007). English
education has been a core focus in China’s new economy. Today there are
roughly 200 million K–12 students learning English in China. As a result,
there are more people speaking English than the total population of the United
States, although their fluency level is varied (Krieger, 2006). Interpreters
are easily available in China for business purposes. Because many Chinese
entrepreneurs have returned from having been overseas students in the West,
including US English as the de facto lingua franca is especially helpful for
American companies’ FDI in China. First, it eases the process of localization
for corporate cultures because certain English sentences, phrases, and terms
can simply be used verbatim. Second, it provides easy access to China’s bilingual workforce. Third, it gives American companies an edge in being the
“trendy corporations” that operate in the global language of English. It needs
to be noted that the transfer of “meaning”—the essence of communication—is
often obstructed by different cultural and thinking patterns, as discussed in
the previous section.
F4: American Pop Culture
Gao and Womack (2007) found that the globalized American popular culture,
including Hollywood movies, MTV music, and American fashion and sports,
is familiar to people in both countries and therefore provides common conversation topics. Young people in China are becoming increasingly globalized,
or some say “Americanized” or “modernized.” One view of globalization
focuses on Americanization and predicts that the whole world eventually
will be homogenized into the American cultural model (Friedman, 1999). In
this perspective, global culture is formed through the economic and political
domination of the United States, which exports its popular culture to the rest
of the world (Wasserstrom, 2010). As a consequence of the globalization of
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American popular culture, American popular cultural forms are familiar to
people in both America and China, making American cultural icons an easy
entry platform for casual conversations. The “not so foreign” Americanized
culture gives American businessmen an opportunity to engage their Chinese
counterparts in casual conversation, relationship building, and trust cultivation. The Chinese people like to use gifts to communicate, and often gifts
with American symbols and icons, American music and scenes are desired.
Without appearing to be imperialistic, American business people can easily
engage their Chinese partners by conversing about familiar aspects of American culture while trying to learn Chinese culture and tradition.
F5: Big Country Mentality
China and the United States are the 3rd and 4th largest countries in terms of
land mass, behind Russia and Canada. Located in the Northern hemisphere,
both countries also have similarities in terms of latitude, climate, and terrain.
Such huge landmasses generate a “big country” mentality for the people of
both countries. For example, Hooke reported in the Asia Times (2007) that
in the next 20 years China needed to buy 3,000 airplanes for its air travel
market at a cost of over $280 billion, which is a scale comparable only to
that of the United States. By the end of 2025, China is expected to have a
fleet of 3,370 aircraft, with 2,470 large planes. The country is expected to
become the world’s second-largest civil aircraft market by 2025, according
to Boeing. Politically, culturally, and militarily, both countries have had
superpower status. For China, the status rests on its cultural dominance of
Asia in the past, its current engine of economic growth, and its influence of
political, economic, and military powers in the future. For the United States,
the status rests on its hard power of military, science, and technology, and
its soft power of globalized American culture. Such similarities result in a
type of “big country mentality” that rests on confidence, diversity inclusion,
and perhaps a little bit of ethnocentrism. However, it needs to be recognized
that the Chinese people may be viewed as more sensitive in their mentality
than the Americans, perhaps as a result of their concern for “face saving”
and “face giving” (Ting-Toomey, 1999) and their protective consciousness of
China’s semi-colonial past in which imperial powers from the West exploited
Chinese people during the Qing Dynasty, and colonized areas of China, such
as Shanghai, Hongkong, and Shangdong Province.
These obstacles and facilitators provide a context for US businesses in
particular, and foreign firms more generally, to think through their approaches
to the China market. The next section details how UPS approached this
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complex business environment in the framework of the concepts developed
in this section.
UPS GOES GLOBAL
The UPS Globalization Strategies—A Global UPS Culture
UPS has undergone a substantial globalization program in China. For instance,
it advocates a global UPS culture to overcome the differences in national and
regional cultures. They use a “Culture Day” strategy to educate employees
about its organizational culture. This strategy seems to be working to overcome the “cultural multiplicity” obstacle, while utilizing the “pragmatism,”
“gender equality,” “English,” “the globalized American pop culture,” and
“big country mentality” facilitators.
In 2005, after taking over Sinotrans, UPS absorbed over 2,000 new Chinese
employees from Sinotrans and the open employment market, which posed a
challenge to combine two national cultures and two corporate cultures into
one entity. Alice Cheony, the UPS China District HR Director and a Singaporean Chinese national, said, “The first thing that we worked on was the
people . . . We gave them proper on-the-job training in a very short period
of time through the Culture Day. We had new hire orientations, on job trainings, mentoring and coaching.” Sebastian Chan, the VP of UPS Supply Chain
Operations (China) added that UPS China organized an “Execution Team” to
apply for drivers’ licenses for all of the new UPS employees. Sebastian said:
We don’t put a nationality on UPS culture. This UPS culture is an allembracing operation. The global UPS culture easily embraces various
the national cultures. UPS is a global company that happens to have its
headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia, U.S. However, we do obey local laws in
different countries. We do respect local cultures and overseas customers.
Our global employees will help us. For example, our Japanese agents will
help us to understand the Japanese, and the German agents will help us to
understand the German culture. We work together as a team. (UPS Focus
Group Interview, 2007)

Another example is the “UPS Culture Day.” This is a group meeting
facilitated by management in order to interpret and share UPS culture with
all employees, which aims to enhance employees’ understanding of UPS in
order to shape consistent behavior patterns and values among the employees. In China from October 2006 to October 2007, Culture Day was usually
set on the third Wednesday of each month, each time for about 30 minutes
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during working hours, and all employees had to participate. UPS values
such as integrity, honesty, commitment, fairness, and self-accountability
were introduced to all employees, as well as corporate history, stories, and
traditions. UPS believes that a global UPS culture can surpass differences
of national cultures between China and the United States and of corporate
cultures between UPS and Sinotrans. One example of the UPS culture is that
UPS employees must answer the telephone within three rings, must mention
their name and department when picking up phones, and when transferring
a phone call, wait for the other party to pick up the phone before hanging up
(UPS Focus Group Interview, 2007).
UPS’s Localization Strategies
As Sebastian Chan at UPS Shanghai mentioned, UPS respects local laws and
cultures. In fact, our research shows that UPS has gone through a thorough
localization process to be successful in China. The various localization processes help UPS to minimize the American “task-orientation obstacle” and
the “business style difference obstacle.”
First, concerning human resources, UPS has hired experienced employees
from UPS who are ethnically Chinese from the United States, Singapore,
Taiwan, and Hong Kong to expedite employee training in China. In addition,
UPS is speeding up its training and promotion of employees from Mainland
China to reflect the culture and dialects of its customers.
Second, UPS gained the privilege of being the official carrier for the Beijing Olympics, giving UPS a special reputation in China. UPS has adapted
its slogans for the Chinese market. For example, “What can brown do for
you?” has never appeared on Chinese TV; instead, its status as the Beijing
2008 Olympics sponsor appears repeatedly. As the color “brown” is not of
particular importance in Chinese culture, UPS did not emphasize it.
Third, UPS understands the importance of intercultural learning and
adaptation. UPS requires a comprehensive personality assessment for its
expatriates, wherever they originate, and encourages them to learn Chinese
culture. Christopher Perkins, a US native who was the Business Development Director for North and East China, stated that he went through much
self-learning to understand Chinese culture and that UPS encouraged him
in this undertaking.
Fourth, UPS China adopts the Chinese relationship-oriented business style
and emphasizes relationship cultivation. UPS also cares for its employees by
providing daily bilingual health and safety tips in its communication. David
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Weisser, a Business Development Manager for Eastern China, said that UPS
China tries to demonstrate the care the company has for the employees’
families. Jessie Liu, HR Director for UPS China Supply Chain Solutions,
said that if employees at UPS are transferred to a different location, UPS
encourages them to move with the family. She added, “There were some that
moved without family and we allowed them trips back more often. This was
a compromise” (UPS Focus Group Interview, 2007).
The UPS Communication Standardization Strategy
UPS China adopted a very unique and effective strategy of communication
to make sure that every employee is on the same page. This strategy is called
the Pre-work Communications Meeting (PCM). PCM is used to convey information, provide new perspectives on a routine job, update new products
and services, and provide safety tips. It can also be used to motivate, inform,
or educate the staff (UPS Focus Group Interview, 2007).
Normally, the PCM reading materials are kept to no more than three pages,
and the ideal duration of a PCM reading is less than 3 minutes. A special PCM
on a significant topic may require more time for reading and interaction with
the audience. In general, however, PCM must be conducted at the start of
work in the morning on every Friday no later than 9:30 am. The PCM has a
written agenda in both Chinese and English, as with all communication sent
via emails at UPS China (UPS China District HR—Employee Communications, Cheong, 2007).
China as Part of the UPS Global Strategy
UPS also must deal with the constantly changing Chinese business environment. Because of the nature of distribution and logistics, in the Chinese
context, agreements must be negotiated with each local government even if
a national agreement has been reached. This is surprisingly similar to UPS’s
expansion across the US, when negotiations were needed for each state.
Nonetheless, China’s membership in the WTO, and the expansion of China’s
domestic market itself, are creating an environment where distribution services
are allowed, and more importantly, are increasing in demand.
While the right market conditions are crucial for a successful investment
by a foreign firm, getting the communication and other cultural aspects right
are also essential. UPS in the China context is well on its way to becoming
a local company serving local needs, while utilizing its global standards and
resources.
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CONCLUSION
The case of UPS as a completely US-owned company operating in China
provides a successful example of a US company’s global expansion strategy.
China’s economic transition to a market economy has made the business
environment more compatible for US companies operating in China. UPS
has taken advantage of each stage of increased freedom in decision-making
and the opening of China to new types of foreign business.
Through this research, we noticed that China’s economy has become
more market-oriented, leaving behind many of its previous characteristics,
which were established during the planned period, and causing the Chinese
business culture to be more Westernized, especially in metropolitan cities
such as Shanghai and Beijing. There are many signs of maturing markets,
growing competition, pressures within China to use standardized pricing
arrangements and contracts, and Chinese companies that would like to see
intellectual property protection for their own innovations. However, all is not
resolved. UPS, for example, is now at a crossroads where it would like to build
a comprehensive domestic distribution and logistics business within China,
but where the fragmented nature of the market resulting from infrastructure
and bureaucratic hurdles is standing in the way. More generally, Huang (2008)
argues that by some measures China’s reforms in the 1980s were more progressive than those in the 1990s. The experimental character of the reforms
has in some cases given way to industrial policy that favors certain state
sectors and urban areas over the private sector and rural economic activity.
Chinese-American cultural differences underscore the fact that China
is a country where American expatriate managers must make a conscious
effort to adjust their communication and business styles to compensate for
the linguistic and cultural barriers. However, some US companies have been
able to navigate the Chinese cultural and economic challenges, and even find
some affinity with the use of English, the big country mentality stemming
from their large domestic economies, and a mutual respect for taking risks.
A new “transactional culture” as suggested by Varner (2000) may be in the
making, which is tied directly to the building of transnational corporations
(TNC) (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989). The strength of a TNC rests on its ability to simultaneously achieve global efficiency, local responsiveness, and
worldwide innovations. A TNC produces goods and services that are tailored
to local needs while maintaining high quality and competitive prices. This
is achievable with innovative integration of culture, communication, and
adaptation to the business environment on the ground. UPS is one example
of a company that is aggressively using this strategy with its self-conscious
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identity as a global company serving a local community in China. UPS tries
to think globally and act locally by avoiding the five cultural obstacles and
utilizing the five cultural facilitators identified in the Chinese and American
communication framework.
The growing and dynamic China market may be the place where the 21st
century business TNC models are incubated (Hexter and Woetzel, 2007).
The China market is indeed important, and lessons learned about strategies
for dealing with the differences in business environment, culture, and communication are essential to US companies’ global success.
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